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ABSTRACT 
 
When given a choice between options with uncertain outcomes, people tend to be loss averse, 
risk averse regarding potential gains and risk prone regarding potential losses. These features 
of human decision making are captured by prospect theory (PT)—a hugely influential 
descriptive model of choice, but one which lacks any unifying principle that might explain 
why such preferences exist. Recently there have been several attempts to connect PT with 
risk-sensitive foraging theory (RSFT), a normative framework developed by evolutionary 
biologists to explain how animals should choose optimally when faced with uncertain 
foraging options. Although this seems a promising direction, here we show that current 
approaches are overly simplistic and, despite their claims, they leave key features of PT 
unaccounted for. A common problem is the failure to appreciate the central concept of 
reproductive value in RSFT, which depends on the decision maker‘s current state and the 
particular situation it faces. Reproductive value provides a common currency in which 
decisions can be compared in a logical way. In contrast, existing models provide no rational 
justification for the reference state in PT. Evolutionary approaches to understanding PT 
preferences must confront this basic problem. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and risk-sensitive foraging theory 
(McNamara & Houston, 1992; Real & Caraco, 1986; Stephens, 1981) are two influential 
accounts of decision making under risk, when the outcomes of decisions are variable. 
Prospect theory (PT) was developed in the social sciences as a descriptive explanation of 
observed choices in humans, to accommodate consistent deviations from the rationality-based 
predictions of expected utility theory (EUT). Risk-sensitive foraging theory (RSFT) was 
developed by evolutionary behavioural ecologists as a normative explanation of how animals 
should choose between stochastic foraging options so as to maximise reproductive success. 
Central to RSFT is the concept of reproductive value, which (for simple scenarios) can be 
defined as the expected future number of offspring produced by an individual over the 
remainder of its lifetime, as a function of its current state (Houston & McNamara, 1999). 
Since natural selection will tend to favour decisions that maximise reproductive value, this 
provides a common currency in which decisions can be compared (McNamara & Houston, 
1986). 
 
A shared feature of PT and RSFT is that they both address how risk preferences depend 
on the decision maker‘s state (e.g. wealth or energy reserves). Because of this similarity, 
several researchers (Aktipis & Kurzban, 2004; Caraco & Lima, 1987; McDermott et al., 
2008; Mishra, in press; Mishra & Fiddick, 2012; Mishra et al., 2012) have suggested that 
RFST may offer an evolutionary explanation for some of the choice patterns described by PT. 
For example, McDermott et al. (2008) explicitly identified the reference state in PT with the 
amount of energy required to survive the night in RSFT, and used this to argue that PT 
preferences are in fact rational. Here we highlight a number of problems with this approach 
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and show that it fails to account for the key features of PT. Because the relationship between 
state and reproductive value depends critically on the biological details of the situation under 
consideration (McNamara & Houston, 1992), the patterns of choice predicted by RSFT do 
not, in general, match those described by PT. We closely examine the similarities and 
differences between PT and RSFT and discuss the extent to which the choices they predict 
are rational. 
 
 
2. Prospect theory 
 
The essential features of PT are captured by the value function in Fig. 1, which shows 
the subjective value a decision maker assigns to gains and losses of varying magnitudes. The 
form of this function was chosen to reflect three key findings from empirical studies of 
human decision making that were not readily accounted for by EUT: 
 
Reference point. The origin in Fig. 1 marks a ‗reference point‘ from which all gains and 
losses are assessed. Typically (though not always) this represents the decision maker‘s 
current state, and reflects the view that changes in state matter more to the decision maker 
than the final state (i.e. the state at which it ends up after making a decision). As Kahneman 
(2003a, p. 704) puts it, ‗the carriers of utility are gains and losses—changes of wealth rather 
than states of wealth‘. This represents a form of path dependence, in that the response to a 
given state differs depending on the route taken (gain or loss) to reach that state. 
 
Reflection effect. The value function is concave (i.e. decreasing in slope) for gains and 
convex (i.e. increasing in slope) for losses. This curvature implies (by Jensen‘s inequality; see 
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Box 1) that decision makers should be risk averse when choosing between alternative gains 
but risk prone when choosing between alternative losses, as found in some empirical studies 
(Kühberger, 1998; Levin et al., 1998; McNeil et al., 1982; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). For 
example, Tversky & Kahneman (1981) found that most people preferred a certain gain of 
$240 over a one-in-four chance of gaining $1000 (and gaining $0 otherwise), but preferred a 
one-in-four chance of losing $1000 (and losing $0 otherwise) over a certain loss of $750. 
 
Loss aversion. The value function is sharply ‗kinked‘ about the origin (i.e. the slope 
changes abruptly, such that the function is not differentiable at this point) and is steeper for 
losses than gains, so that a loss of a given magnitude has a stronger effect on value than a 
gain of the same magnitude. This reflects the finding in some studies that people care more 
about losses than gains of equivalent magnitude (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Kahneman et 
al., 1991; Tversky & Kahneman, 1991, 1992). For example, Tversky & Kahneman (1992) 
found that participants would only accept an even chance of winning or losing money when 
the amount to be won was at least twice the amount to be lost. The general notion of loss 
aversion was famously captured by two professional tennis players, Jimmy Connors (―I hate 
to lose more than I love to win‖; Aktipis & Kurzban, 2004, p. 142) and Andre Agassi (―A 
win doesn‘t feel as good as a loss feels bad‖; Agassi, 2009, p. 167). 
 
 
3. Risk-sensitive foraging theory 
 
RSFT developed from the work of Caraco (1980) and Real (1980) to provide a general 
account of how animals should choose between stochastic foraging options so as to maximise 
their reproductive success (Houston & McNamara, 1999; McNamara & Houston, 1992; Real 
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& Caraco, 1986). The particular risk-sensitive foraging model that has been linked to PT is 
the daily energy budget rule (Stephens, 1981). This rule was developed to explain the 
behaviour of small birds foraging in winter, which need to obtain enough energy during the 
day to enable them to survive the night (when they cannot feed). Building on the work of 
Caraco (1980), Stephens (1981) analysed this problem by modelling a forager that has initial 
energy reserves x0 and needs to get its reserves above some critical level, xc, by dusk to avoid 
starving overnight. The forager has two foraging options that offer the same mean gain, g, but 
differ in variance. If the forager uses the same option throughout the foraging period, then the 
energy gained will have a normal distribution with a greater variance under the more variable 
option. Stephens showed that the probability of ending the day with reserves above xc is 
maximised by choosing the high-variance option if x0 + gt < xc, where t is the time until 
nightfall, whereas the low-variance option is better if x0 + gt > xc. This result can be restated 
as: choose the more variable option if the daily energy budget is negative (i.e. if expected 
gains are insufficient to meet requirements) and the less variable option if the daily energy 
budget is positive. 
 
Stephens‘s model was static, in that the forager could not change its behaviour during 
the foraging period; after making a one-off choice between the high- and low-variance 
options, it persisted with that option until nightfall. Houston & McNamara (1982) extended 
Stephens‘s analysis to allow the forager to make repeated (i.e. dynamic) choices between the 
two options and showed that the rule still holds. It also holds if starvation during the foraging 
period is possible (Houston & McNamara, 1985), except at low reserve levels. Empirical 
work by Caraco et al. (1980, 1990) supported the predictions of the daily energy budget rule, 
but subsequent tests have yielded mixed results (Kacelnik & El Mouden, 2013). 
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4. Connections between risk-sensitive foraging theory and prospect theory 
 
Several researchers have noted a possible link between the patterns described by PT 
and the evolutionary predictions of RSFT (Aktipis & Kurzban, 2004; Caraco & Lima, 1987; 
McDermott et al., 2008; Mishra, in press; Mishra & Fiddick, 2012; Mishra et al., 2012). For 
example, Aktipis & Kurzban (2004) argued that the fact that the value function is concave for 
gains makes sense from an evolutionary perspective, because energetic gains will result in 
diminishing fitness returns—a given increase in energy matters much more to an animal that 
is close to starvation than to one that is well fed. They also argued that losses of energy have 
a bigger impact on fitness than equivalent gains, because losses can sometimes lead to death 
(and hence zero future reproductive success) whereas gains merely extend the lifespan. In a 
similar vein, Mishra (in press) asserted that ‗In fitness terms, marginal losses are much more 
significant than marginal gains of a similar magnitude; the prospect of not reproducing at all 
is substantially worse than increasing fitness slightly‘. If such claims are valid, these factors 
could conceivably result in an optimal forager that is loss averse, risk averse when well fed 
and risk prone when close to starvation. 
 
McDermott et al. (2008) took this approach further by explicitly identifying the 
reference state in PT with the critical level of energy xc in Stephens‘s (1981) daily energy 
budget rule. They presented a model to show that risk-prone behaviour is optimal in the 
‗domain of losses‘, where a forager expects an energetic shortfall compared to xc, whereas 
risk-averse behaviour is optimal in the ‗domain of gains‘, where it expects to exceed xc. This 
strategy maximises the chance of surviving to the next day in an environment where the 
amount of food obtained before nightfall is drawn from a stable probability distribution (e.g. 
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a normal distribution). If McDermott et al.‘s assumptions are valid, such risk proneness in 
losses and risk aversion in gains appears to provide an evolutionary justification for the 
reflection effect of PT. 
 
While superficially appealing, on closer inspection these connections turn out to be 
problematic. There are two related issues: first, whether the function relating reproductive 
value to energetic gains is likely to have the form assumed by McDermott et al. (2008); and 
second, whether the reference state in PT corresponds to the critical level xc in RSFT. We 
discuss both of these issues below. 
 
 
5. What is the shape of the reproductive value function? 
 
Following Stephens‘s (1981) daily energy budget model, McDermott et al. (2008) 
considered the goal of surviving a single day. They showed that under the assumptions of 
their model, the probability of survival—which they equated with fitness—is a symmetrical 
sigmoid function of the expected (i.e. mean) energy gain (Fig. 2). However, this particular 
function is only valid for a very restricted set of circumstances, namely: when the forager has 
no choice between foraging options; when there is no benefit of excess reserves above the 
critical threshold; and when there are no upper or lower boundaries on reserves. Below we 
examine each of these assumptions in turn. 
 
No choice. In McDermott et al.‘s model, the forager has no behavioural choices to 
make; the amount of food it gains before nightfall is a random draw from a stable probability 
distribution. This is equivalent to assuming that, after a one-off choice between alternative 
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options, the forager is constrained to follow some background strategy (McNamara & 
Houston, 1987). In contrast, Stephens (1981) assumed that, after choosing between a high-
variance and a low-variance option, the forager would continue exploiting that food source 
for the rest of the day. This leads to a reproductive value function that is not symmetrical, but 
kinked at the critical value of reserves (Fig. 3, thick grey line). If, instead, the forager can 
switch dynamically between high- and low-variance options, reproductive value is greater 
than under either static option and the function is less kinked, but still asymmetric (Fig. 3, 
solid black line; Houston & McNamara, 1982). 
 
No benefit of excess reserves above the critical threshold. Like Stephens (1981), 
McDermott et al. assumed that the reproductive value at dusk is a step function for which 
there are no additional benefits of having excess reserves above the critical level xc. All the 
forager has to do is survive the night; any decisions made after that point are deemed 
irrelevant to future reproductive success. But unless there is sure to be plentiful food the next 
day, reserves at dawn will influence survival that day (e.g. Houston & McNamara, 1993; 
McNamara & Houston, 1986). To derive the appropriate reproductive value function for this 
situation, we can use the computational technique of dynamic programming to identify the 
foraging strategy that maximises survival over a period of several days (Clark & Mangel, 
2000; Houston & McNamara, 1999; McNamara & Houston, 1986). The resulting function 
(Fig. 4, dashed black line) deviates from the symmetrical sigmoid form assumed by 
McDermott et al., and reveals the importance of having excess reserves above the critical 
level required to survive the night. 
 
No upper or lower boundaries on reserves. McDermott et al. assumed that the amount 
of energy gained or lost during the day has no upper or lower limits. But high reserve levels, 
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although beneficial for overnight survival, may be constrained by physiological limits or 
entail fitness costs, such as an increased risk of predation (Houston et al., 1997; Witter & 
Cuthill, 1993). Incorporating an upper limit alters the shape of the reproductive value 
function (Fig. 4, solid black line). Moreover, in focusing on whether or not the forager has 
sufficient reserves to survive overnight, McDermott et al. ignored the possibility of starvation 
during the day. A lower lethal limit changes the shape of the reproductive value function at 
low reserves (Houston & McNamara, 1999). 
 
The above modifications, which incorporate more biological realism, show that 
reproductive value will not in general have the symmetrical sigmoid relationship with energy 
suggested by McDermott et al. (2008). Other complexities, such as fluctuating environmental 
conditions (Higginson et al., 2012) or the ability to reproduce at high reserves (McNamara et 
al., 1991), will change the relationship further. Clearly, then, the curvature of the 
reproductive value function (i.e. where it is convex and where it is concave), and hence the 
predicted pattern of risk sensitivity, depends critically on the biology of the animal in 
question and the situation it is facing (McNamara & Houston, 1992; McNamara et al., 1991). 
To derive the appropriate form of this function, it is necessary to specify how foraging 
decisions affect the animal‘s future survival and reproduction (Houston & McNamara, 1999). 
 
One clear advantage of this approach is that it reveals how the value of the animal‘s life 
affects its willingness to take risks. Aktipis & Kurzban (2004), McDermott et al. (2008) and 
Mishra (in press) all claimed that animals should be loss averse because energetic losses can 
lead to death and are therefore more important for fitness than energy gains, but this claim is 
unjustified because they did not consider how the value of the animal‘s life depends on its 
future expectations. This is something that is explicitly taken into account when deriving the 
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relationship between reproductive value and energy reserves (Houston & McNamara, 1999). 
Certain forms of this relationship could, in principle, imply loss aversion. McDermott et al.‘s 
survival function does not do so, however, because it is symmetric about the critical level of 
energy (see Fig. 2) and therefore predicts equal sensitivity to gains and losses at this point. At 
the same critical level, Stephens‘s (1981) model predicts differential sensitivity to gains and 
losses due to a kink in the function (Fig. 3, thick grey line), but the pattern is opposite to that 
described by prospect theory (cf. Fig. 1): the loss of a fixed amount of reserves implies a 
smaller change in reproductive value than a gain of the same amount. So a simple application 
of the daily energy budget rule cannot account for this key feature of PT. The same is true for 
dynamic choices (Fig. 3, solid black line). 
 
 
6. Where is the reference point? 
 
In their model, McDermott et al. (2008) explicitly identified the critical level of energy 
xc with the reference state in PT. Anything less than this critical level, representing energetic 
shortfall, was interpreted as a ‗loss‘ and, as identified by Stephens (1981), should favour risk-
prone behaviour. Anything above the critical level was interpreted as a ‗gain‘ and should 
favour risk-averse behaviour. According to McDermott et al., this switch in risk sensitivity 
above and below xc is consistent with the reflection effect of PT. 
 
However, the gains and losses in PT represent changes in state, rather than final 
outcomes such as exceeding or falling short of a critical energy level at nightfall (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979, p. 277). Kahneman (2003a) illustrated the importance of changes rather 
than end states by comparing the attitudes of two people, one whose wealth has decreased 
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from 4 million to 3 million and the other whose wealth has increased from 1 million to 1.1 
million. The second person typically feels happier with their financial report, which is 
something that McDermott et al.‘s model, by focusing on end states, cannot explain. 
Stephens‘s (1981) daily energy budget rule is clearly not reference-dependent in the sense 
used by the architects of PT (Tversky & Kahneman, 1991). 
 
In principle, an optimal individual would be risk averse for gains and risk prone for 
losses if it sat exactly at the inflection point of McDermott et al.‘s (2008) survival function, 
representing the situation where it expects to gain exactly the right amount of energy to be at 
the critical level xc when night falls. But any gain or loss of reserves would change its 
position on this curve, leading to a different predicted pattern of risk sensitivity. This 
illustrates a major challenge facing attempts to connect PT with RSFT: for a sigmoidal 
reproductive value function to predict risk aversion in gains and risk sensitivity in losses 
consistently, its inflection point needs to track the current level of reserves. None of the 
existing approaches successfully address this issue. Aktipis & Kurzban (2004) suggested that 
‗the differently shaped curves for organisms in different states can be profitably thought of as 
the same prospect theory curve with reference points above (in the case of a sated individual) 
and below (in the case of a hungry individual) the origin‘ (p. 146), but they gave no clear 
indication as to what the reference point represents, nor how this state-dependent view can 
accommodate the reflection effect of PT. 
 
 
7. Is prospect theory rational? 
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RSFT, like EUT, offers a rational account of behaviour (Table 1), although the two 
theories invoke different concepts of rationality. EUT assumes that agents seek to maximise 
utility (i.e. the satisfaction they derive from decision outcomes) and in this sense are 
economically rational (Bateson, 2010; Houston et al., 2007; Kacelnik, 2006). Utility is not 
directly measurable and is instead inferred, post facto, from observed choices (for a 
discussion of the problems this approach entails, see Kacelnik, 2006 and Houston et al., 
2007). In contrast, RSFT is founded on the concept of biological rationality, according to 
which individuals have evolved to maximise their inclusive fitness (Bateson, 2010; Houston 
et al., 2007; Kacelnik, 2006). Differently from utility, fitness can be measured independently 
of the decisions made, in the currency of reproductive value (Houston et al., 2007). In 
Stephens‘s (1981) daily energy budget model, overnight survival is the key determinant of 
reproductive value; the optimal strategy thus maximises the chance that energy reserves at 
nightfall exceed the critical level xc. Comparing final energy reserves to xc is logical, because 
the forager dies (and hence has zero future reproductive success) if reserves at nightfall are 
below xc and survives if they are above xc. 
 
Unlike EUT and RSFT, PT does not offer a rational account of behaviour (Table 1). 
The value function in PT is inferred from empirically observed choices, redefining the utility 
function of EUT relative to a reference state in a way that can accommodate deviations from 
economically rational behaviour. Despite their claims, current attempts to explain this value 
function from an evolutionary perspective fail to offer a rational justification for the reference 
state. The effects generated by the reference state are not logical in any of the models 
proposed; indeed, they appear to be irrational (Kahneman, 2003a,b). An economically 
rational decision maker should be concerned with final outcomes, rather than gains and losses 
from an earlier state. 
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8. Concluding remarks 
 
RSFT provides a predictive framework for when individuals should switch between 
risk-prone and risk-averse behaviour (Houston & McNamara, 1999; McNamara & Houston, 
1992). This framework may yet prove to offer useful insights into the evolutionary origins of 
PT preferences (Caraco & Lima, 1987) and we encourage further research along these lines. 
For example, a central feature of RSFT is the dependence of risk attitudes on the decision 
maker‘s current state. Recent evidence suggests that economic decisions in humans vary with 
metabolic state (Symmonds et al., 2010) and financial need (Mishra et al., 2012), but in 
general such state-dependence is underexplored in the PT literature. However, we are 
unconvinced by recent attempts to marry RSFT with PT (Aktipis & Kurzban, 2004; 
McDermott et al., 2008; Mishra in press), which are based on an overly simplistic view of 
how decisions affect reproductive value and fail to account for the key features of PT. Fresh 
approaches are needed to understand the evolutionary basis of decision making under risk. 
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Box 1. Jensen’s inequality and risk sensitivity. Given a particular utility function, the 
decision maker‘s attitude towards risk (sensu variability in outcomes) can be inferred from 
noting the curvature of the function—specifically whether it is convex, concave or linear. 
This rests on a mathematical proof first given by Danish mathematician Johan Jensen 
(Jensen, 1906) and has since become known as Jensen‘s inequality. To understand the basic 
concept in graphical terms, consider a decision maker choosing between two options of equal 
expected monetary value, z. The fixed option always provides exactly z units of money, 
whereas the variable option provides z − ε units on half of occasions and z + ε units on the 
other half of occasions. Which option should the decision maker choose to maximise their 
expected utility? If the relationship between utility (U) and monetary gains is concave (Fig. 
A, solid line), the decision maker prefers the fixed option and hence is risk averse. This is 
because the known utility under the fixed option (dashed black line and black arrowhead) 
exceeds the expected utility under the variable option (dotted grey lines and grey arrowhead), 
i.e. U(z) > ½U(z − ε) + ½U(z + ε). If, on the other hand, the relationship is convex (Fig. B), 
the decision maker prefers the variable option and hence is risk prone, because U(z) < ½U(z − 
ε) + ½U(z + ε). If the relationship is linear, the decision maker should be indifferent between 
the two options (i.e. risk neutral), because U(z) = ½U(z − ε) + ½U(z + ε). See also 
Frankenhuis & del Giudice (2012) and Kacelnik & El Mouden (2013). 
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Fig. 1. The value function of prospect theory. Panel (a) shows the perceived value of gains 
and losses, with the origin marking a reference point from which these gains and losses are 
measured; panel (b) shows how the slope of this value function changes with the amount 
gained or lost. Note that the value function is convex (i.e. has a positive change in slope) for 
losses, implying risk proneness, whereas it is concave (i.e. has a negative change in slope) for 
gains, implying risk aversion (see Box 1). The steeper slope for losses (associated in this case 
with a ‗kink‘ at the origin, which is indicated by the downward spike in panel (b)) implies 
loss aversion. Adapted with permission from Kahneman & Tversky (1979). 
 
Fig. 2. The survival function used by McDermott et al. (2008). The animal gains an 
amount of energy drawn from a stable probability distribution with mean μ and will only 
survive to the next day if it reaches a critical level of energy xc (τ in the notation used by 
McDermott et al.) by nightfall. Panel (a) shows how the mean amount gained (μ, horizontal 
axis) affects the probability of overnight survival (vertical axis), which is assumed to be 
equivalent to fitness; panel (b) shows how the slope of this survival function changes with μ. 
Note that the function is symmetric about xc and so does not predict loss aversion. Adapted 
with permission from McDermott et al. (2008). 
 
Fig. 3. The reproductive value function when the forager can choose between high- and 
low-variance options. Panel (a) shows the relationship between reproductive value and 
energy reserves; panel (b) shows how the slope of this function changes with energy reserves 
(a positive change in slope implies risk proneness, whereas a negative change implies risk 
aversion; see Box 1). If the forager makes a one-off choice and then persists with the chosen 
option for the rest of the day (static model; thick grey line), it should choose the high-
variance option (dashed black line) at low reserves and the low-variance option (dotted black 
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line) at high reserves. However, it can increase its reproductive value by switching 
dynamically between the two options (solid black line). The sudden change in slope just 
before x = 500 indicates a ‗kink‘ in the reproductive value function as the forager switches 
from the high-variance option to the low-variance option; but note that this is an abrupt 
increase in slope rather than the abrupt decrease shown in the prospect theory curve (Fig. 1). 
Parameter values: xc = 500; mean net energy gain per time step = 0 (both options), variance = 
3.125 (high-variance option) or 1.25 (low-variance option); 60 time steps remaining until 
nightfall. 
 
Fig. 4. The reproductive value function when the forager has to survive more than one 
day. Panel (a) shows the relationship between reproductive value and energy reserves; panel 
(b) shows how the slope of this function changes with energy reserves (a positive change in 
slope implies risk proneness, whereas a negative change implies risk aversion). Black lines 
illustrate the case where excess reserves (beyond those needed to survive the night) increase 
the chances of surviving the following day, with either no limit (dashed black line) or an 
upper limit of x = 550 (solid black line) on the amount of reserves the forager can carry. The 
appropriate function for reproductive value is found by maximising survival over several 
days, using dynamic programming (Clark & Mangel, 2000; Houston & McNamara, 1999; 
McNamara & Houston, 1986). The equivalent function for surviving a single day is shown 
for comparison (dotted grey line). In all cases we assume dynamic choices (see Fig. 3). 
Parameter values: xc = 500; mean net energy gain per time step = 0 (both options), variance = 
3.125 (high-variance option) or 1.25 (low-variance option); 60 time steps remaining until 
nightfall. 
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Table 1. Comparison of the key features of three influential theories of decision making. 
Theory Normative or 
descriptive? 
Rational? Basis of utility function 
Expected utility theory (EUT) Normative Yes (economically*) Inferred from choices 
Prospect theory (PT) Descriptive No—violates 
economic rationality 
Inferred from choices 
Risk-sensitive foraging theory (RSFT) Normative Yes (biologically*) Independently measurable 
in terms of reproductive 
value 
*See text for the distinction between economic and biological rationality 
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